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It is Plaintiff-Respondent's position essentially that
since the entire construction project was not complete
at the time of the injury that no acceptance of that portion of the fence completed could be effected. This view
does not comport with reality because it fails to take into
account the fact that most construction projects by necessity involve "piecemeal" completion and acceptance.
The first part of a road project to be completed is
normally the fencing of adjacent landowners' property
along the right of way under construction. As each phase
is completed, it is inspected by the State and either
approved or disapproved. What rational purpose for such
inspection exists if the entire fence must be inspected at
some later date (perhaps several years later)? As a
practical matter, it simply is not done in the manner
Plaintiff-Respondent suggests. Nor does it seem fair to
indefinitely protract the contractor's potential liability.
[See Appellant's Brief on Appeal, pp. 24-25.J
There is ample evidence in the record that there
was a practical acceptance by the State of the segment
of fence in question. It was the State to whom the responsibility to third parties would shift upon a practical
acceptance of the fence, and in this case, the State viewed
the work as it was being done, saw that it was done in
accordance with its plans and specifications and accepted
the work as having been completed and thereby assumed
the risk of harm to third parties which may occur as a
result of the work. That the entire project is not com-
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pleted until some time in the future (some three or four
years after the completion of the right of way fence in
the case at bar) does not change the basic fact that, insofar as the State was concerned, the fence was finished
and there was nothing left for the contractor to do in
connection with it.
POINT II.
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT PRESENT SUFFICIENT REASONS TO EXTEND
LIABILITY TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, W. W. CLYDE & COMPANY.
The Plaintiff-Respondent maintains that the doctrine
advanced in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696
— that one who is negligent should be held liable to third
persons who may foreseeably be injured by his conduct
— has been extended to building contractors. The MacPherson rule has, in fact, been extended to building contractors in many jurisdictions as a logical development
of the doctrine's extension to the seller of chattels some
twenty years earlier.
It is understandable that liability would be extended
to building contractors because of the conceivable results
of his negligence. Usually, in such cases, a structure of
some sort is involved which is in most instances to be
used by the general public or by persons who would not
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normally have the opportunity nor the technical expertise to inspect the structure for defects.
The Tomchik case cited by Plaintiff-Respondent [p.
10 of Respondent's Brief J is illustrative of this point.
This was an action by purchasers of a house against the
general contractors for death of their daughter from carbon monoxide poisoning and for injuries sustained when
they were overcome by carbon monoxide gas, on the
ground of negligent construction of a gas furnace. Here
there was good reason to make an exception to the accepted work doctrine. Few homeowners would have the
technical know-how to make a deteimination beforehand
concerning the safety or reliability of a furnace.
The Texas Law Review article cited by Plaintiff-Respondent [p. 10 of Respondent's Brief] explains another
basic reason for limiting the liability of the contractor;
"The basis of the [accepted work] doctrine is
that one who is not in privity of contract with
the manufacturer or contractor cannot recover
for injuries resulting from the performance of
the work. This privity rationale as applied to
manufacturers has been repudiated, but additional reasons for limiting a contractor's liability have developed. The principal legal argument for limiting liability of a contractor is that
an owner's negligence in maintaining a structure
or land is the proximate cause of an injury while
the contractor's negligence is only a remote
cause. More significant, however, are the reasons
which point to the special problems which con-
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front a contractor. A contractor, unlike a manufacturer, often does not engage in the production
of fungible goods, or anything which closely resembles a finished product; rather his work is
often subject to the control and modification of
subsequent parties. A contractor often has little,
if any, choice in the selection of the plans,
specifications, and materials winch he must use
in his work. For these reasons the courts held
that liability to third parties for injuries resulting from defects in construction work should attach to the person in control of it. However, as
indicated above, there are exceptional circumstances which cause the contractor to be liable.
Among the more prominent are: (1) when a
contractor's work creates a situation that is imminently dangerous to human life, and (2)
knowledge by a contractor that he has constructed a dangerous article." Torts-Negligence
— Independent Contractor Remains Liable After
His Work is Accepted for Injuries Resulting
from His Negligence, 41 Texas L. Rev. 599
(1963).
The case before this Court does not involve a situation that was imminently dangerous to human life nor
can it be realistically asserted that W. W. Clyde & Company had knowledge that it had, in constructing the
fence, constructed a dangerous article.
The State of Utah has not expressly or otherwise
repudiated the "accepted work" doctrine and this case
does not present facts that would so warrant. Utah still
requires privity of contract in actions against a manu-
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facturer based upon warranty and one would not expect
a contractor to be held to a higher standard than a supplier of chattels. This is not to say that the "modern
rule" is without merit. If this case involved a structure
or building that presented a danger to human beings,
an argument for extending that doctrine might have some
weight. Under the circumstances of the principal suit,
it does not.
Even in states that have repudiated the "accepted
work" doctrine and abolished contractual privity as a requirement, the limitation is still applied that where the
contractor merely follows plans and specifications furnished him by another, he may not be held liable unless
the plans were obviously defective. [See Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Company, 221 F. Supp. 129, 133 (N. D.
Ind. 1963).]
CONCLUSION
As a practical economic reality, the fence in question
was complete and accepted by the State at the time the
Plaintiff-Respondent's cow and bull died. Construction
of a fence is not the type of contraction that merits an
extension of the "modern rule" and the "accepted work"
doctrine is still controlling law in the State of Utah. Even
if the Court were to extend the "modern rule" to this
case, the limitation still applies that one who merely
follows plans and specifications furnished him by the
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owner cannot be held liable unless the plans were so
obviously defective as to preclude a reasonable man from
following them.
Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN, SCALLEY,
LUNT & KESLER
STEPHEN G. MORGAN
Attorney for
Defendant and Appellant
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